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Transitional Justice and Civil Society: Learning from International Experience
Abstract: This essay reviews some of the key issues in transitional justice process and
institutional design, based on research and experience working and living in several post-conflict
societies, and suggests that cultural variations in transitional justice goals, practices, and processes are
necessary to accomplish plural goals. One “template” for transitional justice will not work in different
settings, with different causes for human harms and conflict. In short, process pluralism is an essential
part of transitional justice. How different political, social and cultural situations transition from conflict
to less conflictual states will vary from society to society, and “transitional justice” is now as varied in
purpose and implementation as “alternative” dispute resolution is in traditional adjudication processes
in many societies. This essay draws on examples from Argentina and Chile’s emergence from postmilitary dictatorships, and offers some descriptions of how “transitions” themselves are transitional –
learning iteratively from others, while often preserving some of what is culturally particularistic in
valuing memory, punishment, forgiveness, restitution or reintegration at different levels of society. The
essay describes both national and sub-national or transnational efforts at using, not only governmental
processes, but those formed by civil society groups and at trans- and sub-national levels. Provocatively,
and without any clear conclusion, the essay suggests that “democracy” and “the rule of law” may not
necessarily be the only desiderata in transitional justice. The field of transitional justice has grown and
developed both theoretically and in practice and this essay looks at how some of the particulars from
case studies can further our understanding of how transitional justice is more than legal – it must
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include the social, the cultural and take account of individual variations in desires for different kinds of
“justice.”
Keywords: transitional justice, conflict resolution, process pluralism, cultural variation, individual
and collective justice

“The Gulag commissars had retired long ago, with medals and pensions. Not one had been
arraigned. Russia had turned its back on the past. And I, how could I understand? Since the
Holocaust, my world had made a duty of remembrance. Russia, like China, had chosen
forgetfulness. That, said the writer Shalamov, was how people survived. A nation was not built
on truth.”
Colin Thubron, The Shadow of the Silk Road, pg. 204-05 (2007)
“Achieving such a peace won’t require forgetting the past, but it will require putting it aside to
craft a more just future for all the region’s residents.”
Christopher J. Fettweis, The Victim Barrier, Los Angeles Times,
5/2/14

I.

Introduction

As the child of Holocaust refugees from Germany to the United States, I grew up hearing my
surviving grandparents and parents tell stories of atrocities committed in their homeland. Since
then I have been obsessed with the relationship of past harms and cruelties, and the memories
they sear into psyches of individuals and nations, and the human necessity to move forward and
grasp for what is good in humanity. I had nightmares as a child and alternated with strong needs
to attach myself to my family’s pain, and at the same time, to escape it, by focusing on
challenges in my own country and its own wrongs (the enduring legacy of slavery and the civil
rights movements for racial, ethnic and gender equality). My mother, who suffered more, was
the cheerful one, always telling me to smile and look forward, reading to me, and encouraging
me to write novels, teach, play the piano, and dance. My father, who had suffered less, was a
dark and serious European man who taught me European history and himself was obsessed with
the Holocaust and achieving justice. A man who abhorred the death penalty in the United States
2
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would gladly have “strung them up by the balls” if he had encountered Hitler or any of his
compatriots in evil.
By living with these contrasting personalities and their differing reactions to such
horrible events and experiences (and who were happily married for over 65 years and fought
only when they visited Germany many years later and argued about their respective, and very
different, memories), I learned firsthand how different is the human response to the great
wrongs we do to each other in the commission of atrocities, murder, genocides, civil wars, and
the infliction of pain, of both physical and emotional kinds. And, how different is our human
need to remember, to forget, to forgive, or to seek punishment, retribution or recompense or to
struggle to move on, whether with remembrance or studied forgetting or forbearance. I grew up
looking for the “and” in life and law – remembering the past and moving forward; not
forgetting, nor necessarily forgiving, but trying to make things better, rather than worse (my
mother’s legacy).
As a teacher and scholar I have now lived in and studied the need for transitional,
reparative, or restorative justice in over 25 countries with “transitions” from the Holocaust
(Germany, France, Italy), military dictatorships (Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Spain),
“occupations” or “civil war-like” conflicts (Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland-UK), political
transitions from authoritarian regimes (Nicaragua, China, Russia, Singapore, former Yugoslavia)
and atrocities committed against indigenous peoples by colonizers and later settlers (Canada,
Australia and the United States). I have studied other nation’s atrocities where I have not lived
and met the people as closely (Rwanda, South Africa, E. Timor, Sierra Leone). And, I have lived in
my own nation which has not yet fully dealt with its own many acts of injustice (slavery,
destruction of indigenous communities, racially based internment, and ongoing widespread
discrimination against minorities), not to mention the injustices done to women for all of human
history (and continuing).
This essay, reflecting on the individual and collective differences in transitional justice
processes, and institutions, is based on my research and personal experiences, which suggest
that transitional justice can only be effective with “process pluralism” – a wide range of different
processes for civil society, formal legal systems, 2 national capacity building, governmental
2

Studies of modern international law and the institutions it has spawned have been analogized by some to
scientific “complexity” theory, suggesting that the plurality of forces, institutions, and actors cannot be explained
by a single “system” of analysis. Chronicling the growth of diverse formal international judicial bodies (now over
25 different multi-national, regional and international courts), political scientist Karen Alter suggests an
evolutionary approach to international formal justice where the relationship of different courts (dealing with
political, economic, environmental, human rights and other conflicts) to each other is not clear, even as they
influence each other, see Karen Alter, “The Evolving International Judiciary,” 7 Annual Rev. of Law & Soc. Sci. 387
(2011). Here I make the argument that transitional justice is perhaps even more diverse and still evolving as we
respond to extremely complicated “complexes” of different political histories, territorial fights, religious, ethnic
and cultural differences, different levels of violence, and political dictatorship or totalitarian regimes, and new
forms of governmental-religious entities that are both supra-national and sub-national at the same time. Most
“transitional justice” practice and scholarship still assumes the Westphalian nation-state as the relevant political
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transitions and peaceful co-existence, if not total reconciliation. Histories, cultures, atrocities
and harms, as well as the stories or “narratives” told about them, are differentially experienced
both within and between cultures and peoples and so should transitional justice be responsive to
these differences, even in the pursuit of varied and different goals and outcomes. People seek
different forms of “justice,” post-conflict societies have developed different forms of
government (some seeking democratic forms; others not), and different parts of a social order
will place peace and the absence of violence as a priority over other forms of compensatory or
political “justice.” Though many transitional justice scholars see democracy and “the rule of
law” as the desired end-state of a successful transitional process, I do not (necessarily).
Transitional justice addresses itself to both social-cultural (existential) states and separately to
political (structures for existential survival) states. This may be another way to frame the
“peace” vs. “justice” conundrum in our field, but I view peace or the absence of killing and
violence as a “necessary,” if not sufficient, condition for human flourishing and survival.
“Justice,” is for me, more a secondary and less universal “concern”. We need to structure group
living so it fairly distributes life’s goods (and ills) but there are still many competing visions of
what justice entails for those of us alive to experience its absence or presence. Law may, and
has been, used to legitimate human ills (apartheid, slavery and genocides (of indigenous groups,
Jews, religious minorities) have all been “legal regimes” at one time or another), and so the
modern distinction between “rule of law” from “rule by law.” 3 And while “democracy,” as
Winston Churchill is said to have said, “is flawed, but better than all the alternative forms of
government,” it is not necessarily the only or best end-state of all transitional political
processes (in my view). 4
While many scholars and practitioners now focus on the different forms of
“transitional,” “reparative,” “restitutionary,” or “restorative” processes (official governmental,
truth-telling or compensatory, reconciliation, social and private peacekeeping), I suggest here
that the “justice” part of “transitional justice” is just as variable and problematic as the
“transitional,” and must be interrogated for different political, social, cultural, and individual

level of analysis for “post-transition” governance, while conditions on the ground suggest that new formations,
sub- and transnational, or drawn on other collective lines may more accurately reflect reality. This essay also
argues that even with national, religious, ethnic or cultural groups that seem “cohesive” in some way, there will be
great variations among individuals in what they might desire from transitional justice (revenge? Retribution?
Recompense? Reconciliation? Respect? Restoration of rights, property, personhood?). This essay argues for a
plurality of transitional justice processes and institutions, even within a single nation or with a set of particular
harms and wrongs committed against a discrete “people.”
3
See e.g. David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
4
Recent work in “adjectival constitutionalism” suggests that some variable forms of constitutionalism, not fully
“democratic” in a multiple political party, majority voting and representative system, as we frame “democracy”,
such as “authoritarian constitutionalism” (Singapore), see Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism,
manuscript on file with the author, 2014) or “presidential/executive” constitutionalism, may not be fully
“democratic” but might satisfy a variety of other important political goals –peace, ethnic diversity, command
economies, organized economic development, etc. So for me, the jury is still out on what “transitional justice”
must transition to.
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senses of what it means. 5 No one legal or extra-legal system or process can answer to all the
complexities and needs of those who have been wronged by others. As the modern “a”
(appropriate or alternative) dispute resolution movement has questioned the efficacy of a
unitary judicial/trial/legal form of justice, in the face of complex backward and forward facing
human problems, a pluralistic conception of transitional justice may better serve different layers
of human needs – for apologies, restitution, repair, existential respect, and economic wellbeing,
as well as political organization for the future. Individual, group and national or even regional
and transnational needs may require more than one form of “transition” for the different
spheres of human life. 6 More importantly, as our new field now focuses on deep and rich case
studies of the last fifty years of post-conflict societies (many presented at the conference at
which this paper was delivered), we have learned that “one size will not fit all.” More hopefully,
I think, we have also learned that “transitional justice” itself is “transitional” and iterative – we
are learning much from each new varied process or institution (international, domestic, hybrid,
public and governmental, private and civil society) and different “solutions” to the problems of
injustice and great human harm can themselves be modified and changed as we learn more
from each new instance of harm and attempts at healing and repair.
This essay will use a few examples (principally Argentina and Chile) to illustrate how
transitional justice itself must be sensitive to change, cultural, historical, political and local
differences, and the social and political learning that has come from the observations of our
field – by scholars, practitioners and the civil society in which such processes are embedded. As
I will conclude at the end of this essay, we need process pluralism and variations in different
contexts to respond to the differences of circumstances, but most importantly, we need layers
of social-cultural, as well as legal, pluralism (courts, truth tribunals, testimonies, compensation,
memorials and museums, governmental and interpersonal training, mediation, cultural
activities, therapy and use of local and indigenous practices) in the design and practice of those
processes. One size will not fit all and top-down, or internationally imposed legal and political
processes or institutions will not ultimately succeed unless the “acted upon” (the civil or not so
civil society 7) are a part of the construction and implementation (and legitimacy) of any
5

This is related to, but broader than, the “individual” vs. ‘group” rights issues also implicated in any deep
discussion of transitional justice, see e.g. Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical
Injustices (W.W.Norton 2000).
6
This harkens back to the philosopher Michael Walzer’s attempt to specify different first principles for achieving
justice in different spheres of human life, see Michael Walzer, The Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and
Equality Basic Books 1984).
7
Timothy Waters eloquently points out that our assumptions about and definitions of “civil society” in our field
tend to assume a core set of “apolitical” values of “peace,” “non-violence,” “justice,” “truth,” or “repair”
advocated by non-state “members of a group,” when in empirical fact “civil” society also includes groups who seek
other goals, including violence (even if justified by other “progressive” values, like “justice”, or “equality”) and less
than “civil” (meaning peaceful?) activity, see Timothy Waters, “Clearing the Path: The Perils of Positing Civil Society
in Conflict and Transition,” Paper presented to Third International Conference on Transitional Justice, Minerva
Center on Human Rights, Hebrew University (this issue if published in Israel L. Rev). For similar reasons, I prefer to
avoid the claims for the development of “the rule of law” as a necessary goal of transitional justice. Law has
served to legitimize and “legalize” slavery, apartheid, the Holocaust, internments, occupations and many other
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particular transitional justice structure. As some critics of transitional justice have pointed out,
the human atrocities and violations which cause the conditions which require “transitional”
justice do not leave a level playing field of equals –“transitions” are often constructed in
continuing conditions of unequal political, economic and social power, with disparate abilities
and conditions for participation in that construction of the “transition.” 8
II.

The Thesis: One Size Will Not Fit All: Process Pluralism and Cultural Imperatives

As an interdisciplinary scholar of sociology, anthropology and political science, as well as
law, I have learned that different histories, cultural formations, group and national memberships
and identities, and individual human variations will not allow a single conception of
“transitional” “restorative” or “reparative” justice to function adequately in the many ways we
need to move from the past of harm to a future of greater well being or healing. 9 In the words

atrocities and wrongs. “The Rule of Law” is no more universal and apolitical a concept than “civil society” or
“transitional justice” (which similarly seems to assume a uni-linear and one directional progression from one bad
state (authoritarianism, dictatorship, violence, genocide, civil war) to a “universal” good state of democracy, rule
of law and justice, equality and political participation for all citizens. I see transitional justice as a movement and
practice (now being theorized as well, Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, Oxford Univ. Press 2000) away from human
(both state and non-state) bad acts but what emerges “after” we account for those bad acts is less clear to me as
any universal state, other than the search for the elimination of man’s inhumanity to man (and women, of
course!).
8
See e.g. Rimona Afana, “Transitions Lacking Transition: Civil Society Responses to Justice and Reconciliation in the
Israel-Palestine Impasse,” paper presented for Third International Conference on Transitional Justice, Minerva
Institute at Hebrew University (this issue, if published, in Israel L. Rev.); Iris Young, Inclusion and Democracy
(Oxford University Press).
9
Many scholars of transitional justice now seek to typologize or taxonomize a variety of both criminal
(prosecution) or more civil (reparative and some forms of restorative) or hybrid (some truth commissions) forms
of post-conflict processes, where transitional justice has multiple goals and root disciplinary frames – criminal
punishment and deterrence, civil restitution or reparation, human rights violation documentation, historical
national and individual narrative “truth” and “correction”, civil society development and capacity building, social,
as well as emotional, psychological, and governmental reconciliation and reconstruction. For many (not me, see
below), these goals also include “rule of law” or democracy building. See e.g., Ruti Teitel, Globalizing Transitional
Justice: Contemporary Essays (Oxford Univ. Press 2014); Lisa J. Laplante, “Just Repair,” Michigan J. of Int’l Law
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2450749. The term “justice” has never been uniform in
philosophic or practical understandings, so different processes in post-conflict settings are also enactments of our
continuing variation in distributive, substantive, equitable, reparative, retributive and other forms of justice. I do
not formally take on these issues here, but I want to highlight that as long as we do not have a universal
conception of ‘justice” in ordinary legal terms, whether criminal or civil, it should not be surprising that we will not
have a single, uniform or even “template”-like form of “transitional” justice. As domestic legal systems are now
more hybridized and variable in their forms of aspirational or delivered justice, see Felix Steffek, Hannes Unberath,
Hazel Genn, Reinhard Greger & Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Regulating Dispute Resolution: ADR and Access to Justice
at a Crossroads (Hart Publications 2013), so too must the international transitional justice field recognize variability
in purposes, structures, remedies, processes and institutions. The transitional justice field is also marked by the
complexity of somewhat competing goals of “justice” (the human rights and international criminal law approach)
and “peace” (the conflict resolution and peace building approaches, see e.g., Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson
(eds). Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions (Princeton University Press 2000); Craig Zelizer & Robert
Rubinstein, eds. Building Peace: Practical Reflections from the Field (Kumarian Press 2009); Antonia Chayes &
Martha Minow (eds.) Imagine Coexistence: Restoring Humanity After Violent Ethnic Conflict (Jossey Bass 2003).
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of the American novelist William Faulkner, “the past is never dead; it’s not even past.” 10 How we
deal with the past varies with human experience. How laws and governments deal with the past
must reflect that varied collective and individual human experience. Among the challenges of
any regime of transitional justice is how to reconcile the “pain of past suffering” (prosecution,
punishment, deterrence, and recompense) with the “present and future needs” (peaceful coexistence, new governmental structures, political and economic equity, reconciliation) of any
post-conflict/atrocity society, 11 where different societies and cultures may have different
hierarchies of values, preferences and desires. 12
Whatever the goals of formal governmental transitional justice design, actual
transitional justice will be performed, enacted and delivered by members of civil society, unless
state control is totalistic. In Habermassian political terms, the “acted upon” must have a say in
the rules and processes which are intended to govern them; 13 in realist-sociological terms, they
will “perform” transitional justice as cultural and social, as well as political and legal, forces
elucidate and constrain those values and practices. 14
In this paper I focus on Argentina and Chile (with occasional references to other regions
in which I have worked), to demonstrate how cultural variations, within somewhat comparable
conditions, have produced very different transitional justice models, even with some major
similarities, cautioning us to be wary of overly generalized templates for complexities of
cultures and contested meanings of “justice.”
The first “Truth and Reconciliation” commission was not the now famous and most
public process in South Africa, inspired by Desmond Tutu’s particularly “religious” (both
Christian and indigenous values) conceptions 15 – but in Central America, followed by South
America. 16 TRC’s have become the most common “face” of involving the larger society in
transitional justice, which also may include the prosecution of harm doers, lustration or purges
of former officials, development of new governmental and civil society institutions,
compensation for injuries and lost property, rebuilding of infra-structure, homes, schools and
other major institutions, as well as the more subtle and difficult task of “reintegrating” a nation
torn apart by civil war, atrocities, genocides, and other grievous wrongs. For those of us who

William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun. (Random House 1951).
Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge Univ Press 2004) at 78.
12
Id. At 82.
13
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action I and II (Beacon Press 1984-7).
14
Within the relatively new transitional justice literature there is increasing critique and sensitivity to the
“colonizing” “imperialist” and “western or northern” “templates” of exogenously developed transitional justice
processes and institutions, see e.g., Stephanie Vielle, “Transitional Justice: A Colonizing Field?,” 4 Amsterdam L.
Forum 59 (2012); Anna Dolitdze, “Beyond the Binary of Exogenous and Endogenous Transitions: The International
Governance of Transitional Justice in Georgia,” Paper prepared for Transitional Justice and Civil Society
Conference, Minerva Institute (2014, this issue, if published in Israel L. Rev.).
15
Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (Doubleday 1999).
16
Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (2nd ed.
Routledge 2011)
10
11
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study transitional justice the basic questions remain difficult, both in theory and in institutional
design and practice:
1. How much “truth” and accountability is necessary to move forward for a new
legitimate regime to be born?
2. What should be the consequences of past wrong-doing (prosecution and
punishment, compensation, confession, apology, narrative, amnesty, lustration,
forgiveness)?
3. What should be the relation of a new state to the old? (How much dismemberment
of old institutions and removal of officials? How much continuity is required, both
for social functioning, with often competing claims for legitimacy?)
4. How does a civil society “reconceive” (or “reintegrate” or “re-imagine) itself?
(Formal institutions, memorials, museums, media, cultural activities and
exchanges, 17 economic development projects, etc.)
5. What processes/institutions are best used to accomplish the above (should they be
ad hoc/temporary or permanent)?
6. How are legal/governmental/political processes deployed within societies or
communities with varying emotional, religious, ethical and cultural cohesion and
commitments? 18
7. What is or should be the role of non-governmental processes or institutions in
reconciliation/peacebuilding?
Most discussions of transitional justice focus on the international, governmental, and
institutional processes often developed from the “top-down” (whether internationally developed or
domestic). More recently we have focused on the role of “civil society” – the people who live in and
constitute the society, whether or not they are in engaged in formal governmental positions (and
whatever their roles in the relevant conflict, harms or atrocities). As in all discussions of transitional
justice, one of the most difficult questions is what should be the proper “recipe” for the relation of
peace (the civil society’s probable current desire) to justice 19 (the need for rectification of past harms to
the development and establishment of important and future-guiding standards of wrongdoing and
rectification in order to ensure political and social legitimacy of authority, among other goals).

17

So much of the “peace movements” in so many conflict sites include civil society cultural, arts, educational, food,
and sports exchanges, see e.g. the work of The Parent’s Circle, Seeds of Peace, Promises (film) (J. Shapiro, B.Z.
Goldberg, & C. Bolado 1998) and so many others.
18
The relationship of the “rational” or “principled” to human instrumental “interests” and more emotional,
ethical/moral or religious “needs” in the design and implementation of any legal or political process is the
intellectual conundrum currently facing not only transitional justice but the design of any deliberative democratic
process, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Roles in Deliberative Democracy, 5 Nevada L. J. 347 (200420050 at 366; Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge, 1999); Martha Minow,
Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Beacon Press 1998).
19
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward A Jurisprudence of Law, Peace, and Justice with a Tilt Toward Non-Violent and
Empathic Means of Human Problem Solving,” 8 Harvard Unbound 79-108 (2012-2013).
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Formal processes of transition are always embedded in the specifics of the larger society and
culture in which they are located. At the grossest level we could say that post-Holocaust Germany is not
the same as even its closest competitors in horrors—South Africa’s apartheid or the New World’s
centuries long institution of slavery, managed by an association of Old World private and state interests
for financial profit from the heinous mistreatment of human beings. 20 Is genocide worse than total, but
living, subjugation? Is civilian participation in murders, theft, destruction, rape, kidnapping and torture
worse or the same as state sponsorship of the same kinds of activities? Is transition from authoritarian
control of citizens the same as movement away from specified “targets” of such harm, not affecting the
majority of the population? 21 In short, despite the desire on the part of many of us who labor in these
fields, I do not think there are only “universal” issues to be confronted in the transition from one kind of
injustice to a more just society. Man’s inhumanity to man is as variable and complicated as can be, as
our many languages, cultures, moral systems, religions and psyches demonstrate. 22
Modern transitions from military dictatorships, civil wars, genocides, and post-Communist, postmilitary dictatorships, or other post-authoritarian regimes have varied in the last 50 years, as cultures,
polities and people vary in what they value and who grabs control of the “transitional narrative.” Even
given our hope for some more “universal” understandings of basic human rights and notions about what
is required for human flourishing, 23 I think a close study of successful (or fragile, but peaceful transitions,
such as current Northern Ireland 24) recent transitions demonstrates that we must describe, account for,
and allow “plural transitional” strategies, at both the national and individual levels. We need, in
transitional justice, what has been argued for in some forms of domestic and international procedural

20

How do we measure the harm of a particular atrocity? Total numbers of lives lost? –then slavery, a transnational
horror with probably the most numbers of lives lost and human suffering suffered is likely “the worst.” How have
we “transitioned” from that transnational atrocity? See David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western
Culture (Oxford Univ Press, 1988). Rather gradually, one might say, with modern human trafficking still occurring,
that one is not “over” yet. See James Hathaway, “The Human Rights Quagmire of ‘Human Trafficking,” 49 Va. J.
Int’l L. 1 (2008). Or, Rwanda, given its fast ferocity, the worst, for having killed so many so quickly as the world
stood idly by? See Philip Gourevitch, We Wish To Inform You that tomorrow we will be killed with our families
(Picador 1998). Or, if not the total number harmed, the total number “responsible” for creating, condoning and
collaborating in the harms? Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices
(Norton 2000).
21
See e.g., Amy Chua, World on Fire (Doubleday 2003); Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the
New Nationalism (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1993).
22
I say this despite the efforts of some scholars to document a universal morality, see e.g. John Mikhail, Elements
of Moral Cognition: Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2011).
23
Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights (W.W. Norton 2007).
24
Potentially troublesome again soon, see Sinn Fein’s Leader Held in IRA Killing, LA Times, May 1, 2014; Anne
Cadwallader, “Don’t Ignore Northern Ireland’s Ghosts,” NY Times, May 3, 2014. George Mitchell, Making Peace
(University of California Press 2001). See the contrast of Mitchell’s role as mediator in N. Ireland to Richard
Holbrooke in Balkan conflict in Daniel Curran, James K. Sebenius & Michael Watkins, “Two Paths to Peace:
Contrasting George Mitchell in Northern Ireland with Richard Holbrooke in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 20 Negotiation J.
513 (2004).
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law 25 -- “process pluralism” – different kinds of disputes and different kinds of parties may require
different kinds of processes. How we design and choose among them for what purposes in which kinds
of political and social environments is a difficult and complex issue of modern jurisprudence. 26 And,
transitional justice regimes of any kind, must be studied, monitored and observed over time for
calibration, “correction” and change as they may themselves create new issues of conflict, human rights
violations and violence. 27
In recent human history, transitional justice, including TRCs, special criminal courts, hybrid
courts, local courts, and indigenous peace and adjudication processes 28 (such as gacaca 29 and ubuntu 30)
have been incremental and iterative –we need to learn something, but not too much, 31 from each one
that has gone before, without, in my view, creating a single template from which all transitions much be
constructed. The nature of divisions within societies (religious, political, class, whether sharing land or
competing for it, 32 degree of integration 33) varies too much for there to be a single design solution or
process for transition from danger to relative safety. Noted political scientist and historian and theorist
of transitional justice, Jon Elster has said, “I have found the context-dependence of the phenomena [of

Carrie Menkel-Meadow (ed). Complex Dispute Resolution: Foundations, Multi-Party Disputes, Decision Making
and Democracy, International Dispute Resolution (Ashgate, 2012); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lela Love, Andrea
Schneider & Jean Sternlight, Dispute Resolution: Beyond the Adversary Model 2nd ed. (WoltersKluwer, 2012).
26
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design? And What We Should (Not)
Do About It: Lessons From International and Domestic Fronts,” 14 Harvard Neg. L. Rev. 195-231 (2009).
27
As the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda begin their process of closing
down and their impacts are measured, we know that ongoing political rivalries and lack of acceptance or legitimacy
of these tribunals by some sectors of the relevant societies, can and has led to claims of election fraud, ongoing
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Prosecutions, The Rule of Law and Civil Society, paper presented to 3rd International Conference on Transitional
Justice, Minerva Institute (this issue if published). Cambodia’s extraordinary court also suffers from lack of funds,
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badly damaged post Khmer Rouge regime. See e.g., Louise Mallinder, “Lawyering in Non-Democratic States:
Preliminary Reflections on Cambodia, Presentation at 3rd International Conference on Transitional Justice, Minerva
Institute, this issue, if published, Israel L. Rev.
28
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Maya Goldstein Bolocan, “Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice,” 2 J. of Disp. Resol. 355
(2004).
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I am fond of saying “not every conflict is Munich or Viet-Nam” (one a reference to perceived too easy
collaboration and compromise, the other to unnecessary war), see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Compromise,
Negotiation and Morality,” 26 Negotiation J. 481-497 (2010).
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transitional justice] to be an insuperable obstacle to generalizations.” 34 In addition, transitions
themselves are incremental and iterative – Chile and other Latin American nations have recently gone
from immunity-granting processes to some prosecutions of those formerly granted amnesty, 35 and
Spain is currently reexamining its own post-Fascist past. 36 Transitional justice, within particular postconflict sites, may evolve as people (and generations) change with the transition itself and what they
learn from watching others grapple with similar, but also different, dilemmas. 37 In short, transitional
justice is itself transitional and should be flexible and capacious enough to include pluralistic forms of
process and institutions.
III.

Some Illustrations from Chile and Argentina: Variable Transitions within the Transitions

On September 11, 1973 a coup, led by Augusto Pinochet (and other military leaders), against
elected socialist leader Dr. Salvador Allende in Chile, led to a dictatorship lasting more than 15 years in
which thousands were “disappeared,” murdered, tortured, brutally treated, threatened, surveilled,
detained, and attacked, both physically and emotionally. Estimates of those killed (about 3,000) and
tortured still vary, though the Jesuit brothers at Universidad Alberto Hurtado kept the best records they
could. Of those who were not killed or detained, many exiles fled the country to agitate for justice from
other ports in South America (ironically, including Argentina, with its own military dictatorship), Europe
and the United States (whose government was fully implicated in Pinochet’s coup). 38 Unlike many
dictators, Pinochet eventually sought the legitimacy of election-plebiscite which, to his surprise, he
lost! 39 In 1988 Patricio Alywin was elected President and a truth and reconciliation process was begun
with a human rights investigation which included human rights activists and Chilean exiles, including
Jose Zalaquett, now a professor of law and human rights at the Universidad de Chile. 40 The jurisdiction
of the commission in Chile only extended to cases of “torture resulting in death” and was criticized for
failing to treat the cases of the up to 200,000 (a significant percent of Chile’s population), who were
allegedly tortured and then released. 41 The report of this commission was completed in 1991 (1800
Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge U. Press 2004).
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, After Amnesties Are Gone: Latin American National Courts and the new Contours of the
Fight Against Immunity, Human Rights Q.; Alexandra Huneeus, “Judging from a Guilty Conscience: The Chilean
Judiciary’s Human Rights Turn, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 99 (2010).
36
Jim Yardley, “Facing His Torturer as Spain Confronts Its Past,” NY Times, April 7, 2014.
37
In particular, see the move away from amnesties to prosecution in Chile and Argentina, Roht-Arriaza, supra note
35.
38
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New Press 2013).
39
For some reviews of this history see Pamela Constable & Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under
Pinochet (WW Norton 1991); Steve J. Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile (Duke University Press 2006); Ariel
Dorfman, Heading South, Looking North (Penguin 1999); NO! Pablo Larrain (dir.) 2013. (movie chronicling the
election campaign against Pinochet).
40
With issues of peace vs. justice and the limited scope of investigation depicted in the “fictionalized” treatment in
Ariel Dorfman’s play Death and the Maiden (1991, movie 1994). See Jose Zalaquett, “Balancing Ethical Imperatives
and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 Hastings
L. J. 1425 (1991-1992).
41
The current President of Chile Michele Bachelet is the daughter of one of the murdered victims. Her recent
opponent for the presidency was the daughter of a member of the military regime. Some of Pinochet’s children
have been active in current politics as well, with his daughter running for Senate a few years ago.
34
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pages, with few copies initially printed, of proceedings that had been held mostly in private, with
relatively little public comment at the time). In 1978 an amnesty law was passed granting amnesty to
those who participated in these acts (“in defense of the state”) and Pinochet became a “senator for
life,” even as he “voluntarily” stepped down from his country’s leadership.
Ten years later, in a period characterized by many of us in the transitional justice field, as the
“peace vs. justice” dilemma, Chile provided a “classic” example of the bargain made for “peace” as the
transition to a more democratic state allowed many former office holders and military officers to remain
in place, with relative impunity (at least until much later). As is now well known, in 1998 Pinochet
traveled to London for medical treatment where he was indicted in Spain for human rights violations of
those with Spanish citizenship (and on the basis of some universal jurisdiction legal principles) for
human rights crimes committed in Chile. After groundbreaking litigation in the British courts, Pinochet
was allowed to return (without extradition to Spain for trial) to Chile, where despite efforts to indict him
for tax claims and other legal wrongs, he died without coming to trial. Soon thereafter, amnesty laws
were repealed (mostly through judicial interpretation) and some prosecutions (most notably of Catholic
priests complicit in the regime) began and are ongoing. The Inter-American court of Human Rights
which had pioneered the recognition of the human rights violation of state enforced “disappearances”
and the state’s duty to investigate all such claims in Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (1988) 42 found
that the amnesty laws passed in Chile could not override the state’s duty to investigate, prosecute and
punish those responsible for such wrongful acts (see Luis Alfredo Almonacid Arellano et. al. v. Chile
(2006) (forced disappearances by the state now being a violation of the International Convention on the
Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearance (2006). Over one thousand have now been tried,
about 250 found guilty, but only of the worst “crimes” of torture and death and not for more common
forced “detentions.” 43
In 1976 a military coup in Argentina including Jorge Videla and others, used several alleged left wing bombings to seize power from Isabel Peron (the widow of Juan Peron) and proceeded to engage in
forced disappearances, murders, torture, detentions, surveillance and other human rights violations,
now labeled “the Dirty War.” Estimates of those murdered now exceeds 30,000 (comparable in
percentage of the population to Chile). 44 After losing the Falklands-Malvinas War against the United
Kingdom in 1983 the military dictatorship fell and Raul Alfonsin assumed the Presidency. Like Alywin in
Chile, he announced the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CONADEP), which
researched, investigated and reported on (in the now readily available report Nunca Mas! now in
multiple printings) the forced disappearances and other acts of detention and torture. Carlos Nino (in
exile in the United States) and a distinguished philosopher of law and one of the intellectual fathers of
transitional justice 45 became advisor to Alfonsin to assist in the development of a new democratic state.
Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser C) No 4. (July 29, 1988).
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 35.
44
A dramatic, if fictionalized treatment of the disappearances can be found in the novel, The Ministry of Special
Cases (Alfred Knopf, 2007) written by Nathan Englander, ironically written from Argentine files archived in Israel.
See also, Andrew Graham-Yool, A State of Fear: Memories of Argentina’s Nightmare (Eland 1986; 2009).
45
Carlos Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (1996, published posthumously Yale University Press); Carlos Nino, “The Duty to
Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina,” 100 Yale L. J. 2619 (1990-91).
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Unlike Chile, Argentina began compensating some victims, especially given the persistent activism of the
Madres de Plaza de Mayo ( a human rights groups of mothers and grandmothers of the disappeared
who continued to march in front of the Casa Rosada during and after the military dictatorship to
demand accountability and information on their disappeared children). 46 Videla was eventually
prosecuted (and died under house arrest), as were other military officials, until both Alfonsin’s and later
Carlos Menem’s regime issued new pardons (amnesty or “Full Stop”) laws . In 2003, under President
Nestor Kirchner the Argentine Congress revoked the Pardon laws, while the Argentine Supreme Court
declared them unconstitutional. The new Argentine Constitution in 1994 incorporated several
international human rights treaties as part of its law (making it a “monist” regime of international law),
making legal action possible in national courts for international legal claims. Argentina is actively
prosecuting some surviving perpetrators, not only through official state prosecutors, but with the
representation of victims by the civil law procedure of “victim’s counsel” or private prosecutors,
including law clinics in some of Argentina’s law schools. 47
So, with this very brief summary of the history of military dictatorships in neighboring countries
in a similar era, seemingly following similar paths (gross human rights violations, democratic regime
change, truth and reconciliation commissions, some prosecutions, legal changes and judicial and
legislative personnel changes, commitment to use of international legal standards in domestic settings),
what are/were the “cultural variations” in this seemingly similar trajectory from human abuse to
(somewhat) reconciled societies?
In 2007 I studied transitional justice (as a Fulbright scholar) in Chile and Argentina, while
teaching in both countries. Interviews with my informants from a variety of walks of life demonstrated
great differences in reactions to the two military dictatorships. As has been documented in many more
formal studies, many Chileans, while denouncing the dictatorship of “the past,” were much more
concerned with talking about their economic progress – Pinochet may have been a human rights
problem, but his “neo-liberal” economic reforms were largely successful in improving economic
conditions. While I was living in Chile the World Bank removed Chile from the international “poverty
list,” despite the fact that another World Bank study named Chile (along with the US and Brazil) as
having one of the greatest rates of disparity between the richest and the poorest of its citizens. In
almost every Chilean family I visited we were warned not to talk too much about politics because in
every family (both in the capital city of Santiago and in time I spent in Temuco, in the south, and in more
rural and smaller cities) there were people “on both sides” and it would cause enormous disruption “so
many years later” to revisit the old wounds. Priscilla Hayner had similar experiences when she was told
in 1996 that it was “in bad taste” to talk about Pinochet abuses in social settings. 48 (I have been told
similar things in Spain). Among upper middle class professionals, including many of my colleagues at
several universities, it was not uncommon for there to be “mixed marriages” (not religious but
46

The additional horrors of the Dirty War included the abduction and illegal adoption of babies born to detained
women (the mothers were later killed), dramatized in the Academy Award winning film, The Official Story (1986).
47
Other human rights activists (outside of Argentina and Chile) have long argued for prosecutions and have been
critical of the amnesties originally passed in Chile and Argentina, see e.g. Diane F. Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime,” 100 Yale L. J. 2537 (1990-1991).
48
Hayner, supra note 16 at 49.
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political!). In one case a strong Pinochet supporting and wealthy family had paid for the safe passage out
of the country of their leftist relatives who decamped for Europe for the duration of the Pinochet
regime. Others have described this as “collective amnesia” – the desire to forget about painful pasts by a
group to avoid dealing with hard truths in order to live more comfortably in the present and plan for the
future. Without wanting to characterize a whole society, it was remarkable to see so many, despite
world-leading human rights courses and legal activism by some in the Chilean universities, prefer to
avoid such conversations (except on the annual day of protest commemorating a single act of Pinochetera violence. In 2007 there was a brief and violent skirmish with the local police and students [I was
rushed home by my colleagues in a feared national emergency which received no international
attention] – and then all was calm the next day).
In contrast, in Argentina in 2007, despite the focus on the ever unstable economy (following the
2000 economic crisis and ongoing amparo actions in the courts by the thousands to recover lost funds),
Nunca Mas! remained visible in every bookstore and in many street kiosks. Virtually everyone was still
talking about the Dirty War and families were more “unified” in where they had stood in the troubled
times. Many of my Argentinean students had “disappeared” relatives and were quite willing to talk
about it in class. I worked with some of the human rights lawyers who had created the key human rights
organizations in Argentina and who bravely and courageously founded law clinics in the private law
schools (as well as at Universidad de Buenos Aires, the leading public law school). Prosecutions were
ongoing and discussed and the Argentine Supreme Court was proudly declaring its “separation of
powers” review of governmental actions and private claims. A procedure for reparations was in place.
Most dramatically, a short public service film aired on TV asking anyone who had any doubts about their
parentage (possible “baby stealing” victims) should contact a special social service agency to discuss
DNA testing and the possible psychological effects of learning who your real and adoptive parents really
were. 49 Many movies were produced focusing on the Dirty War era and novels and other artistic
representations took on the thorny question of whether human atrocities could actually be represented
in the arts. 50
Side-by- side, two Spanish speaking post-military dictatorship countries separated by the
Cordillera de los Andes seemed worlds apart in their post-conflict reactions to somewhat similarly
suffering regimes (fighting “communism and left –wing politics” with US supported repressionary
tactics). 51 Why? Though many were to observe the “cultural” features described in the Colin Thubron
quote which opens this paper (a “European” (Argentinean historical identification with Europe) focus on
the past in Argentina (with the highest per capita representation of psychiatrists in the world!) as a
cultural difference in the two nations’ demographic and psychic make-up, with Chileans more focused
See e.g., Estela Bravo, Who Am I? (2008); Peter Svatek, Stolen Babies, Stolen Lives (Canada, 2008).
Perhaps one of the most compelling academic conferences I ever attended was a conference in the 1980s at
UCLA about whether the Holocaust or similar “unspeakable” mass atrocities could ever be represented “truly” in
the arts. We all know the answer to that question now. See, Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust:
History, Theory, Trauma (Cornell Univ. Press 1996); See e.g., S. Spielberg, Schindler’s List 1993; Angelina Jolie, In
the Land of Blood and Honey (2011).
51
Of course, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay among others, also had military or other dictatorships in
the same era.
49
50
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on “the future” (both economic and nation “rebuilding”), there are structural differences as well.
Ironically, for Chile the military dictatorship was somewhat of a “one-off,” if longer, aberration in an
otherwise more democratic and judicially passive state. 52 The Truth and Reconciliation process and
investigation was less transparent, restricted in jurisdiction, and not fully circulated to the public when
completed.
In contrast, when organized by internationally renowned legal theorists, the Argentine TRC was
more public and observed by thousands as Nunca mas! became a domestic and then international best
seller. Argentina’s human rights community was supported and activated by international networks 53
and when exiles returned with European and North American rights consciousness, despite the back
and forth of amnesty laws, both the courts and the legislature actively revamped the pardon laws. In
Chile the amnesty laws were more “circumvented” than overruled, until more recently. 54 The
interaction of the larger social and political “culture” (perhaps more “diverse” in European origin) in
Argentina, and legal culture in these two nations thus produced, at least in the first decade after the
military dictatorships, quite different social, if not, legal, post-conflict societies. The Kirchners (first
Nestor, now Christina) used their connections with human rights groups to fuel their political
successes 55 and although Michele Bachelet is herself a closer victim (both in the death of her father and
her own detention), now in her second presidency, she does not dwell on the past, but is focused on
social, economic, and political reforms for the present and future. (There are fewer museums or national
monuments to the victims of the dictatorship in Chile (being currently discussed 56) as there now are in
Argentina (at ESMA—Escuela de Mechanica de la Armada), “a museum of human rights,” the place of
torture and detention of over 5000, at the site of the naval mechanics training school, on a major
thoroughfare in Buenos Aires 57:

Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists and the Contest to
Transform Latin American States (University of Chicago 2002); Javier Couso, Legal Culture and The Judicialization
of Politics in Latin America (2010).
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Globalization (Routledge 2011).
54
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Guillermo Calderon, Villa (2011) (play dramatizing controversies surrounding establishment of a memorial to
Pinochet regime victims). See also, Susanne Buckley-Zistel & Stefanie Schäfer, Memorials in Times of Transition
(Intersentia 2014).
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The role of these monuments to preserve the memory of human atrocities is an important part of both
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Terror Tours” in N. Ireland, Yad Vashem, The Holocaust Museum in Washington DC, Berlin. Etc.) creating a new
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present for past harms? What is, as some scholars have called it, “The Ethics of Memory”? (Avishai Margalit, The
Ethics of Memory (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
52

15

16

ESMA, Buenos Aires, June 2012

17

Others suggest that the “Pinochet effect” 58 (Pinochet’s public and international indictment) has
somewhat transformed reticence to speak in Chile and that Chile’s and Argentina’s revocation of their
amnesty laws are demonstrations of how “transitional justice” evolves within post-atrocity-post conflict
regimes over time. Thus, cultural, social and political differences in approach may come to converge
(especially with publicity and transparency and international influence). An argument could be made
that “transnational” “international” or “hybrid” influences in transitional justice may ultimately “even
out” or smooth out cultural differences, as in the current prosecutions in both Chile and Argentina. I am
not so sure, either that it does or will happen or that it is necessarily a totally advantageous
development. “Convergence” or a move toward more uniform or regular practices can also stultify
creative and adaptive devices for transitional or transformative justice practices and institutions.
Argentina, for example, has creatively pioneered “mega-trials” with multiple defendants being tried with
tens of victims and witnesses (with their own private lawyers) in specially organized criminal
proceedings. 59 On the other hand, with one party domination (Concertación (de Partidos por la
Democracia) in Chile, Peronism in Argentina) strong in both countries, Chile and Argentina are
experiencing different post-dictatorship electoral politics (with more rotation in the leadership in Chile,
as Argentina appears to be moving in the direction of “executive or presidential” constitutionalism (like
other South American countries in the shadow of Chavez-styled super-Presidentialism). 60
Ironically, the transitional processes in Chile and Argentina, operating on national and political
scales, also spawned quite interesting local examples of other forms of “transitional justice”
demonstrating that even repressive regimes can offer other models of “justice.” As Pinochet’s neoliberalism sponsored capitalism granted indigenous Mapuche peoples privatized hectares of land
(contrasted to the Northern American concepts of tribal “reserves”) to cultivate, the government also
established a mediation agency through CONADI (corporacion national de desarollo de indigena) to
peacefully mediate land claims among and between indigenous families, permitting a certain amount of
autonomy within an otherwise repressive regime (see picture below) (which may also be considered a
“pacification” plan as more activist Mapuche contested government land grabs and were later
prosecuted as “terrorists”).

Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect (UPenn Press 2005).
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 35.
60
As with Bolivia’s Evo Morales and Ecuador’s Correa. While South America, in general, moved away from military
dictatorships in the 1990s, more modern electoral politics form a hybrid, if somewhat flawed, version of
democracy with “hyper-Presidentialism, executive power and frequent constitutional amendments to legitimize
strong executives, many without term limits or terms that are changed by Constitutional amendment. Note that I
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defined in the “Western” and “Northern” ambit. Many post-conflict societies may turn to democratic seeming
elections, but this is often accompanied by strong executives, corruption, weak judiciaries or other variations from
“conventional” constitutional democracies, see. E.g. Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism: 18102010: The Engine Room of the Constitution (Oxford University Press 2013); Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian
Constitutionalism (unpublished paper on file with author).
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CONADI Mediation Session on Mapuche Lands, Southern Chile 2007
(Lohengrin Ascensio, Mediator (and Lawyer), CONADI

In Argentina, the local prison in the city of Buenos Aires (Devoto) developed a fully autonomous
and self-governing wing of inmates being educated by the Universidad de Buenos Aires for degrees in
law, sociology, economics, psychology and humanities, while granting leaves for internships outside of
the prison to ease the “transition” to civil life in one of the more progressive prisons I have witnessed in
decades of prison observation in the US. Thus, different conceptions of “transitional” justice operate at
different levels of societies, both within repressive and democratic regimes and serve as a reminder that
different problems may require different levels, layers and structures of process.
IV.

Implications and Lessons for Cultural Variations and Process Pluralism in Transitional
Justice

As the Truth and Reconciliation processes in different countries in Latin America were taken up
in other post-conflict or transitional regimes, a greater variety of processes have been used. Most
dramatically the South African TRC, building on Desmond Tutu’s use of Christian and indigenous
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religious values of forgiveness, also used amnesty to shield many wrongdoers from legal action, 61 but
also used television to educate not only victims, perpetrators and bystanders, but the more general
public, a practice which was demonstrated to have increased “human rights consciousness” in the
general population. 62 Newer TRCs have used multiple locations to reach members of diasporas, such as
the Liberian TRC which operated branches in various locations in the US. 63 Others have used multiple
processes, as the often extolled “indigenous” practices of gacaca in Rwanda combined local mediative
practices with westernized adjudicative practices, concurrently with both national and international
prosecutions for genocide and less serious crimes, 64 or ubuntu (humanity) practices in much of Southern
Africa.
At the same time, critics of transitional justice practices, both of TRCs and courts, have
suggested that the definitions of wrongs have often excluded those perpetrated against women or
children or ethnic or religious minorities and that even seemingly “human rights sensitive” organizations
and processes re-perpetuate existing (national? gender? class? religious?) hierarchies by harm
definition 65 and official actors within the processes of transition. 66 And, as noted by Colin Thubron
above, some societies, like China, have not even acknowledged their genocides or mass atrocities, such
as the Cultural Revolution or the Great Leap Forward, which may turn out to have killed the most human
beings in actions taken by a government in the twentieth century. And, among those many
unacknowledged modern atrocities, there is Japan’s refusal to apologize for their use of Korean
“comfort women.” 67 New critics of some transitional justice processes have argued for less
“westernized” legalistic categories, suggesting that even the most truth-seeking TRC’s still individualize
presentations of harm and narrative, rather than allowing another form of “collective memory” to be

Now most controversially criticized on this and other grounds, see e.g. David Dyzanhaus, Judging The Judges,
Judging Ourselves: Truth Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order (Hart 1998). Critics of TRC processes have
suggested that “reconciliation” through forgiveness and amnesty can be in a “zero-sum” relationship to the
experience of “justice” by those wronged in some, if not, most post-conflict settings. Economic and political
inequalities may not be solved by ‘social exchanges” or narrative talk therapy, see e.g., Afana, supra note 6. Others
have suggested more “universal’ standards for procedural fairness in truth commissions, see Mark Freeman, Truth
Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
62
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63
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64
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and Reparation (Oxford University Press 2012).
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are now international human rights and war crimes but were they in earlier periods? Increasingly, many regimes
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developed, used or created in such settings – the telling of and acknowledgement of “collective
memories of wrongfulness” or group harms and group narratives. 68
There will be many opportunities for transitional justice institutional design as more and more
nations begin to acknowledge their wrongdoing under civil society and international pressure (or after
the effective date (2002) of the Rome Treaty makes signatories responsible for enforcing international
criminal laws in their national courts).
As post conflict-atrocity societies attempt to transition to a new society, the challenge is to
compensate, remember and correct for the past, with an eye toward what might be created for the
future. This too may be culturally varied – are human/political rights enough? What of economic
opportunity or justice? Land allocations? 69 Property return or compensation? 70 Fear of revenge and
retribution? Cultural values certainly vary in tolerance of difference and “living together” or preferred
separation? 71 Many designs of transitional justice presume that the individuals constituting a particular
society can be encouraged to share enough common “values” (peace, co-existence, human wellbeing) to
create and sustain a new society after great harm has produced hostile separation. But just consider
where we are now 72—Jerusalem – with conflicts among those who claim to have been here “before” the
“others,” and worshippers and believers in totally different value systems are unlikely to transition to a
shared understanding of their joint “narrative.” In my work here with the Parent’s Circle we have
learned that trying to encourage empathy by exploring presumed empathetically “shared” human loss is
not reciprocal or equal. Palestinians see Yad Vashem and say “what does European Jewish suffering
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See Rachel Lopez, “The (Re) collection of Memory After Mass Atrocity and the Dilemma for Transitional Justice,”
available at http://www.ssrn.com/link/Drexel-U-Leg.html. This claim for “collective memory in transitional justice
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religious homogeneity (with attendant discriminatory and genocidal practices).
72
During the 3rd International Conference on Transitional Justice at Hebrew University, May 19-20, 2014 there
were participants from Jews and Arabs in Israel-Palestine, as we peacefully continued to discuss possible peace
seeking and reconciliative activities. Two months after our academic conference on Transitional Justice: Lessons
from international Experiences, violence broke out again in Gaza after three Israeli teenagers were murdered, a
Palestinian was murdered in revenge and rockets from Gaza and incursions into Gaza by the IDF seeking to disrupt
Hamas’ rockets and tunnels. The death toll at this writing is over 500. We often tend to forget that violence,
terrorism, kidnapping, etc. are also seen as “transitional Justice.” See Waters, supra note 7.
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have to do with us? We are not the Germans and you took our land.” How can there be “reintegration
or reconciliation” if there never was “integration” or conciliation to begin with? 73
It may be easier to attempt reconciliation and reintegration of a presumed “homogenous” polity
(like a nation-state (Germany?) if there is such a thing (I doubt it, as I live in a sharply demarcated “red”
(Republican) and “blue” (Democrat) society), than widely diverse political units made of people with
widely disparate values. 74 So with the harsh cynicism of some, but the optimism my parents gave me, I
think the only answer is that “one size will not fit all.” Transitions to peaceful human flourishing (both in
process and in outcome) will have to vary with the conditions on the ground. We are best served by
“process pluralism” that seeks to provide different and simultaneous models of transitional justice,
where some prosecutions for leaders and evil planners to punish, deter and purge, but more gentle
processes of truth-full narrative or civil society economic and cultural collaborations and exchanges
(such as those somewhat successfully explored in post-genocide Rwanda and pre-peace agreement
Palestine-Israel 75) exist concurrently.
In my own research and political work I have come to believe that “bottom up” civil society
interactions, education and joint labors must provide the ground and context for “higher up” diplomatic
and political institutions and processes so that somehow individual and cultural differences can inform
and correct the dangers of universal, internationally “imposed” (and ineffective) templates. The
challenge of transitional justice is to find a way for particular civil societies’ (or ”bottom-up”) efforts to
inform and participate in “higher up” leader-led diplomatic and peace negotiations, as well as the new
forms of governance that must be constituted after ceasefires and peace agreements are achieved,
however fragile. Over the years, there have been many efforts at such “mid-level” mediation of conflict
resolution (e.g. social-psychologist Herbert Kelman’s “problem solving workshops” in the Israel-Palestine
disputes, 76 through combined uses of psychology, group decision making, political strategies, and midlevel thought and government leaders, in meetings most often hosted away from conflict zones). The
tensions between the conflict resolution-peace seekers, human rights and international criminal law
activists, and actors on the ground (including leaders, “freedom fighters” and civil societies) remain
great and complex in almost every conflict region in the world, each with its own mix of common and
disparate human elements.
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Stories of “peace in the desert” of historical friendly relations vie with counterstories of early and continuing
conflict between Arabs and Jews, see e.g. Ari Shavit, My Promised Land (2013). For an important blueprint for
beginning a reconciliation process, even before there is peace “on the ground,” see Maya Kahnanoff, Ofer Shinar
Levanon & Mohammed Abu Nimmer, Reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Position Paper (Parents’
Circle-Families Forum, 2014).
74
And of what relatively “peaceful” Belgium with total political gridlock in a linguistically, religiously and otherwise
bi-furcated nation, see Robert Mnookin & Alain Verbeke, Persistent Nonviolent Conflict Without Reconciliation:
The Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, 72 Law & Contemp. Prob. 151-186 (2009).
75
See the work of many peace seeking NGOs in Israel-Palestine, such as Parents Circle Families Forum and others,
e.g., Tor Ben-Mayor, Two Sided Story (2012).
76
H.C. Kelman, “Interactive Problem Solving in the Israeli-Palestinian Case: Past Contributions and Present
Challenges in R. Fisher, Paving the Way: Contributions of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking Lexington
Books 2005>
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Most importantly, as the experiences and history of Chile and Argentina have taught me, even
seemingly “similar” cultures are in fact different, and may deal with their past evils and blueprints for
the future differently. I continue to hope that those engaged in the process of emerging from or seeking
to end conflict and human atrocities are capable of learning from each other and themselves,
transitioning within their transitions (e.g., from amnesty to prosecution, from dictatorship to very
precariously different democracies, 77 from civil wars to fragile peace, to hopeful reconciliation in joint
economic development). 78 As cultures and nations differ, so do individuals in what they want – some
will want punishment, retribution and compensation; others will want a safe world which permits
children to grow up peacefully with the possibility of human flourishing. We will have to try all the
different measures and tools at our disposal for the enormous challenges ahead in so many different
contexts. Chile is not Argentina and Northern Ireland is not Israel-Palestine. Economic and political
justice and aspirations for real equality of opportunity and achievement must be included in any
reconciliation measures that begin in hopeful dialogue and narrative strategies within and across
cultural divides. Transitions and reconciliation efforts work best when we are optimistic, not pessimistic,
about our futures, as individuals and as collectivities. We are all human beings and I hope we will find
more than one way to peacefully co-exist, by creating hope that we can transition to something better
than senseless conflict, even if our understandings of what the end product of “justice” might be are
culturally and personally variable.
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Many are currently worried about the “executive presidentialism” of Christina Fernandez Kirchner as she clings
to power and “uses” connections to human rights groups for, as some allege, corrupt purposes.
78
Is Rwanda at least one still-fragile success? Is South Africa still a possibility (with a less violent but sill grossly
unjust economic regime)? Is Post-Holocaust Europe (even on the verge of new economic and migration issues) still
a possible regional model? Do the failing states of Syria, Ukraine, Sudan offer counter tales of dissolution rather
than “peaceful, flourishing” transitions? I am doubtful any one model can fit our current crises, but there are
elements of learning in each as we tackle ever new problems of seeking peace and justice.
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